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Insurer's Duty
(continued from page 143)
types of insurance, namely unin-
sured motorist and "no-fault" cov-
erage. The statutes governing these
coverages provided that they
would be included automatically in
a policy unless the insured specifi-
cally rejected them. Ark. Code
Ann. § 23-89-403 (Supp. 1984) and
Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-202 (Supp.
1989). This language was much
stronger than that found in the
underinsured motorist statute,
which simply required that the
coverage be "made available."
This difference suggested to the
court that the state legislature con-
sidered uninsured motorist and
"no-fault" coverage more impor-
tant than underinsured coverage,
and that Shelter Mutual's duty to
provide underinsured coverage
was simply to make it available to
its policyholders.
There were few decisions, from
any jurisdiction, which interpreted
the "make available" language.
Edens relied heavily on Jacobson v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Com-
pany, 264 N.W.2d 804 (Minn.
1978) which approved of an insur-
er's actions as "commercially rea-
sonable" when that insurer "made
available" coverage by offering an
application accompanied by infor-
mation about the coverage to its
renewing policyholders.
Shelter Mutual did not offer
information to the Johnsons. Us-
ing the Jacobson analysis, Edens
argued that Shelter Mutual did not
"make available" the coverage.
Edens contended that consumers
in general, and the Johnsons in
particular, were too ignorant to
decide on the value of such cover-
age without more information. Re-
jecting this argument as one better
addressed to and by the Arkansas
legislature, the court stated its hesi-
tancy to read a "commercial rea-
sonableness test" into the statute
and refused to do so.
Summary Judgment Was Proper
The Court of Appeals affirmed
the summary judgment for Shelter
Mutual on the basis that the insur-
er complied with the Arkansas
underinsured motorist statute. The
court did not reach the question of
whether coverage would have been
imputed if Shelter Mutual had
violated the statute, nor did the
court consider whether Edens's
status as a passenger, rather than a
policyholder, would have affected
his ability to recover under im-
puted coverage. Finally, the court
noted that this was a close case and
that the waiver of oral argument by
both sides was unfortunate.
Frank J. Troppe
Granting Contested
Telephone Rate
Increases Without
Evidentiary Hearing
Violates Due Process
Recently, the Supreme Court of
Iowa ruled on the constitutionality
of allowing a utility rate increase
when opponents of the increase
were not given the opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing. In Office of
Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State
Commerce Commission, 465
N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1991), the court
held that the Iowa Utilities Board
("Utilities Board") violated the
Office of Consumer Advocate's
("OCA") constitutional rights to
due process when the Utilities
Board determined that a proposed
telephone rate increase was reason-
able without having allowed the
OCA opportunity to present evi-
dence contesting the credibility of
material facts submitted in support
of the increase.
Background
In December 1985, United Tele-
phone Company of Iowa ("Unit-
ed") filed a rate increase applica-
tion with the Iowa State
Commerce Commission (now
known as the Iowa Utilities
Board). United sought to increase
its directory assistance charges
from $0.25 to $0.75 and to create
new operator service charges rang-
ing from $0.75 to $2.75 effective as
of January 5, 1986. Pursuant to
Iowa Code § 476.6(7), the United
official responsible for rates and
tariffs attached to his application a
sworn affidavit stating that the
proposed increases were necessary
to offset increased expenses in-
curred by the company as a result
of a contractual change with
Northwestern Bell. In addition,
United provided a statement of
projected revenues and expenses
under the current and revised
agreements.
United notified its customers of
the proposed increases by letter
and invited them to file written
objections with the Utilities Board.
The Utilities Board received sever-
al objections. One of these was
from the OCA, asserting that the
increases were unreasonable and
unjust and asking the Utilities
Board to deny United's application
or, alternatively, to docket it for
further investigation. OCA stated
that United had failed to supply
sufficient evidence supporting the
reasonableness of the increases and
questioned United's claim that the
proposed changes were revenue
neutral. It charged that United had
understated its revenue projec-
tions and overstated its expenses.
United answered OCA by argu-
ing that Iowa Code § 476.6(7) and
corresponding administrative reg-
ulations allowed rate making with-
out evidentiary hearings when rate
changes affected only specific ser-
vices and not basic or general rates.
Although United admitted that its
expense and revenue figures were
based on estimates, the company
argued that the increases were rea-
sonable because it would suffer
revenue losses even with the pro-
posed increases.
Despite OCA's concerns, and
without granting an evidentiary
hearing, the Utilities Board autho-
rized the tariff, or rate increases.
When, however, the Utilities
Board received a subsequent pro-
posal by United to increase rates
unrelated to those in its previous
request, the Utilities Board ques-
tioned whether the proposed tariffs
were piecemeal, general ratemak-
ing requiring the submission of
additional factual evidence. The
Utilities Board then suspended
United's rate increases and asked
OCA and United to submit briefs
solely on the legal issues of whether
the increases were specific or gen-
eral and whether the agency had
the authority to approve the in-
creases without evidentiary hear-
ing.
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The Utilities Board's Conclusion
Basing its conclusions solely on
the data submitted by United, the
Utilities Board concluded that it
had the authority to approve Unit-
ed's increases because the rate
changes: (1) affected only specific
services and not basic rates, (2) had
a minimal impact on United's rate
of return, and (3) were motivated
by an increase in costs beyond
United's control. The Utilities
Board further concluded that the
increased rates were reasonable
and just.
OCA disputed the Utilities
Board's findings regarding the na-
ture of the proposed increases and
moved for rehearing. OCA also
renewed its contention that cus-
tomers would be harmed by the
Utilities Board's refusal to grant a
hearing allowing OCA to present
opposing evidence and cross-
examine United's experts before
deciding whether the increases
were reasonable. However, the
Utilities Board denied the motion
for rehearing, citing its authority to
make rate-increase decisions with-
out evidentiary hearings. The
Board also stated that because its
staff had previously examined
United's projections, it saw no
benefit in an evidentiary hearing.
Given these facts, the agency held
that OCA would have to do more
than merely protest the proposed
increases to raise a material issue
of disputed fact that would require
a hearing; it would have to identify
affirmatively the correct informa-
tion.
The District Court's Decision
OCA petitioned the Iowa dis-
trict court for judicial review of the
Utilities Board's findings. In cases
brought under the Iowa Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, such as the
present case, the district court act-
ed as an appellate court and decid-
ed whether the agency committed
legal error. Iowa Code § 17A. 19(8)
(1989). On review, the district
court found that under certain cir-
cumstances the Utilities Board had
a statutory right to allow rate mak-
ing without evidentiary hearings.
The court also found, however,
that OCA had raised material is-
sues of disputed facts regarding the
reasonableness of the increases on
the basis of United's revenue and
expense projections. Therefore, the
court held, because OCA repre-
sented the rights of United's cus-
tomers, due process considerations
required the Board to conduct a
meaningful hearing on the pro-
posed increases. The district court
thus remanded the case back to the
agency for resolution. United, as
intervenor, appealed that decision
to the Iowa Supreme Court.
The Iowa Supreme Court's
Decision
United raised two issues on ap-
peal to the Iowa Supreme Court. It
argued first that the district court
based its ruling on an issue of
constitutional due process that had
not been preserved in the record
before the Utilities Board. Second-
ly, United claimed that the district
court erred in holding that OCA
had raised issues of material fact
that would constitutionally require
a hearing before the Utilities
Board.
Preservation of Constitutional
Claim
United argued that OCA had
not raised a due process challenge
in its initial objections to the Utili-
ties Board's action. Because this
constitutional issue had not been
raised before the agency, United
contended, OCA was barred from
raising the issue on appeal. Howev-
er, the supreme court did not find
dispositive the fact that OCA had
not raised the constitutional issue
in its initial pleadings to the agen-
cy. Although the court noted that
the general rule barred the intro-
duction of new issues raised on
appeal, the court held that an ex-
ception existed when the issue was
raised for the agency's consider-
ation in a motion for rehearing.
The court noted that OCA's mo-
tion for rehearing included the due
process claim. In its application for
rehearing, OCA had specifically
cited section one of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States
Constitution and article one, sec-
tion nine, of the Iowa Constitu-
tion. OCA claimed that these due
process considerations required
that it be allowed the opportunity
to present evidence and arguments
contesting the proposed tariffs be-
fore the Utilities Board issued its
final ruling. The court further not-
ed that OCA had claimed from the
outset that the utility's consumers
were entitled to be heard on the
proposed rate increases. Therefore,
the court held that the due process
challenge had been raised with
sufficient timeliness to give both
United and the Utilities Board an
opportunity to respond.
In addition to contesting the
timeliness of OCA's constitutional
challenge, United also alleged that
OCA had not raised the issue with
sufficient specificity to enable the
Utilities Board to know what error
OCA alleged. United claimed that
to preserve the issue on appeal,
OCA should have specifically cited
to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The su-
preme court dismissed this argu-
ment, stating that the other safe-
guards secured by the fourteenth
amendment clearly had no bearing
on the case. The court found that
OCA's repeated requests for an
evidentiary hearing sufficiently
alerted the agency to the fact that
OCA's constitutional challenge re-
lated to the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and not
to some other clause.
Right to an Evidentiary Hearing
Both parties agreed that no stat-
ute existed that mandated an evi-
dentiary hearing in this case. The
parties disagreed, however, on
whether the due process clause of
the U. S. Constitution mandated a
hearing. The court held that due
process would require a hearing if
the parties disputed underlying
material facts. OCA contended,
and United denied, that OCA had
raised sufficient factual disputes
before the Utilities Board.
The supreme court examined
the district court's conclusion that
OCA had, in fact, raised at least
three disputed issues of material
fact related to the reasonableness
of the proposed rate increases. The
district court had noted first, that
United had failed to document the
terms of its contract with North-
western Bell. Second, United did
not provide the source of its pro-
(continued on page 146)
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jected directory assistance usage
data or its corresponding revenue
and expense projections. Because
these omissions precluded inde-
pendent verification of the reliabil-
ity of United's figures, the district
court found that OCA's concerns
regarding inflated numbers and
duplicate recovery were validated.
Finally, because the Utilities
Board had failed to furnish OCA
with the calculations that led it to
conclude that the increases were
just and reasonable, its conclusion
was open to dispute.
On appeal to the supreme court,
United argued that the district
court's findings were merely a reit-
eration OCA's contentions. United
claimed that unless OCA presented
its own contrary data refuting
United's calculations, OCA had
not disputed material facts making
an evidentiary hearing worth-
while. Although the supreme court
agreed that purely legal disputes
did not warrant an evidentiary
hearing, the court dismissed Unit-
ed's argument.
The supreme court agreed with
the lower court's findings that
OCA has raised sufficient factual
issues warranting an evidentiary
hearing. The court found that the
Utilities Board had mistakenly de-
cided that no genuine dispute re-
garding material facts existed when
it relied solely on United's version
of the facts and prevented OCA's
challenge. Because OCA repre-
sented United's consumers in this
case, the court held that constitu-
tional considerations necessitated
that OCA be given the opportunity
to examine and to test the credibil-
ity of the data upon which the
Utilities Board based it decision.
The supreme court therefore af-
firmed the district court's remand
to the agency for further proceed-
ings. Aida M. Alaka
Insurance Agent May
Have Bound Company
To Temporary
Insurance Policy
Despite
Misrepresentation By
Insured
In Ellingwood v. N.N. Investors
Life Insurance Co., Inc., 805 P.2d
70 (N.M. 1991), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that
genuine issues of material fact ex-
isted with respect to the authority
of an insurance agent to bind the
company to an oral contract for
temporary insurance coverage and
with respect to alleged misrepre-
sentations made on an application
for insurance coverage.
Background
On October 30, 1985, James
Streeter ("Streeter") applied for
health and life insurance from
N.N. Investors Life Insurance Co.
("N.N. Investors"). Streeter suf-
fered from scoliosis, a spinal defor-
mity, which was plainly visible.
The agent for N.N. Investors asked
Streeter questions and completed
the application forms based on
Streeter's verbal responses. The
agent asked whether Streeter ever
had any indication, diagnosis or
treatment of various respiratory
diseases or muscle and bone disor-
ders, to which Streeter replied,
"No." The agent indicated on the
form that Streeter's lower spine
had been surgically fused and re-
corded the name, address, and
phone number of Streeter's treat-
ing physician. Streeter did not
have a physical examination or
interview with a physician prior to
completing the insurance applica-
tion of N.N. Investors.
The language of the application
provided that coverage would not
be effective until the insurance
company approved the application
and the applicant paid the first
premium. Streeter signed the ap-
plication and asked the agent when
coverage would be effective. Ac-
cording to the affidavit of Stree-
ter's grandmother, the agent re-
sponded, in her presence, that
coverage would begin upon receipt
of payment of the first premium;
when Streeter paid the agent, the
agent replied that coverage was in
effect at that time. Relying solely
on the application, the company
subsequently approved major
medical and term life insurance
coverage for Streeter. The insur-
ance certificate stated that cover-
age would begin at 12:00 noon on
November 12, 1985.
On November 10, 1985, Streeter
entered a hospital emergency room
for treatment of severe bronchial
pneumonia. Streeter died 3:40
a.m. on November 12, just over
eight hours prior to the time of
effectiveness of coverage, as stated
on the insurance certificate.
Claims and Defenses
Upon receipt of claims under
the insurance policies, N.N. Inves-
tors investigated Streeter's medical
history and discovered that he suf-
fered from scoliosis and had suf-
fered pulmonary problems in the
past. N.N. Investors claimed that
Streeter's failure to disclose these
medical conditions amounted to
material misrepresentations. As a
result, N.N. Investors refused to
pay benefits under the policies and
refunded the premiums paid by
Streeter to date. In addition to the
claim of misrepresentation, N.N.
Investors argued that under the
terms of the application, insurance
coverage was not effective until
approved by the company. N.N.
Investors argued that the terms of
the agreement excluded coverage
for pre-existing conditions; since
the pneumonia occurred prior to
the effective date of coverage, it
constituted such a pre-existing
condition.
In response, Patricia Ellingwood
("Ellingwood"), as representative
of Streeter's estate, sued N.N. In-
vestors for breach of contract and
negligence. Ellingwood claimed
that N.N. Investors's agent had
apparent authority to bind the in-
surance company by oral agree-
ment to temporary insurance cov-
erage effective upon receipt of
payment. Ellingwood further
claimed that N.N. Investors violat-
ed a statute regulating temporary
insurance coverage which she
claimed constituted negligence per
se on the part of N.N. Investors
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